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At the beginning of the thirteenth century the Mongol emperor Chingiz-Khan 
mobilized a war-machine that succeeded, within the space of a few decades, in 
overwhelming the majority of the known world. In 1235 his third son and succes-
sor, Ogodei, launched a new attempt to realize his father's idea of Mongol world-
conquest. He unleashed Mongol forces under the command of his nephew Batu, 
the son of Chingiz-Khan's eldest son Jochi, towards the west.1 The strategic 
commander of the Mongol armies, however, was undoubtedly the experienced 
general Siibotei.2 Between 1236 and 1240 the Russian principalities collapsed un-
der the weight of successive Mongol attacks3 and in the winter of 1240-1241 Batu 
1 The plan to conquer the West was one of the main decisions of the quriltai of 1235. See 
Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen. M. Taube, ed., Munich 1989, § 270, 200-202; The Histo-
ry of the World-Conqueror by 'Ala ad-Din Ata-Malik Juvaini. Translated from the text of 
Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by J. A. Boyle with an Introduction by D. O. Morgan, Man-
chester 1997, 196-200 (henceforth: luvaini, History); The Successors of Genghis Khan 
Translated from the Persian of Rashid al-Din by J. A. Boyle, New York - London 1971, 
54-56 (henceforth: Rashid, Successors)·, W. Abramowski, "Die chinesischen Annalen 
von Ögödei bis Güyük. Übersetzung des 2. Kapitels des Yüan-shih," Zentralasiatische 
Studien 10 (1976), 130. For the Mongol idea of world-conquest, cf. J. Masson Smith, 
"The Mongols and World-Conquest," Mongolica 5 (1994), 206-214. 
2 Probably no Mongol general played a greater role than Sübötei in establishing and 
maintaining the early Mongol empire. He was destined to be the mastermind of this 
campaign because he had been - together with general Jebe - commander of those 
Mongol troops, which had undertaken a raid through Armenia, Georgia and Russia in 
the years 1220-24. Due to his successes he held the honorary title ba'atur ("valiant"). Cf. 
P. D. Buell, "Sübötei Ba'atur (1176-1248)," in In the Service of the Khan, Wiesbaden 1993, 
13-26; R. A. Gabriel, Genghis Khan's Greatest General. Subotai the Valiant. Westport 2004. 
3 For the conquest of the Russian Principalities, see B. Spuler, Die Goldene Horde. Die 
Mongolen in Rußland 1223-1502. Leipzig 1943,16-20; G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, 
The Mongols and Russia. New Haven 1953,48-52; I. Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia 
1200-1304. London - New York 1983, 76-96; J. Martin, Medieval Russia (980-1584). 
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and Sübotei were ready to enter Latin Christian territory for the first time.4 The 
right wing of their army passed through Galicia into Poland, where they defeated 
the combined forces of Poles and Germans near Liegnitz (Legnica) in Silesia on 9 
April 1241.5 At the same time Batu and Sübotei had been advancing into Moravia 
and Hungary, where they achieved a victory on the banks of the river Sajó near 
Mohi on 11 April. A large part of Hungary was occupied for more than a year 
and utterly devastated. The defeated Hungarian king Bela IV fled before the 
Mongol advance and Qadan, a son of the Great-Khan Ógódei,6 was given the task 
of capturing him. First Bela tried to take refuge with Duke Friedrich II of Austria, 
who was contemptuous of the Hungarians' plight and extracted a large ransom 
from the king before sending him on his way to Croatia.7 There Bela hoped to 
find refuge in Zagreb but the Mongols followed in pursuit since the extirpation of 
the enemy's rulers and nobles was one of the main goals of Mongol strategy.8 
Cambridge 1995, 135-140; L. de Hartog, Russia and the Mongol Yoke. The History of the 
Russian Principalities and the Golden Horde 1221-1502. London - New York 1996, 29-34. 
4 For the Mongol invasion of Europe, see G. Strakosch-Grassmann, Der Einfall der Mongo-
len in Mitteleuropa in den Jahren 1241 und 1242. Innsbruck 1893; J. J. Saunders, The Histo-
ry of the Mongol Conquest. London 1971; H. Göckenjan and J. R. Sweeney, Der Mongo-
lensturm. Berichte von Augenzeugen und Zeitgenossen 1235-1250. Graz 1985, 36-63; H. 
Göckenjan, "Der Westfeldzug (1236-42) aus mongolischer Sicht," in Wahlstatt 1241. 
Beiträge zur Mongolenschlacht bei Liegnitz und zu ihren Nachwirkungen. Würzburg 1991, 
35-75; J. Gießauf, "Der Traum von der Weltherrschaft. Eine Skizze der politischen Ge-
schichte des mongolischen Großreichs vom Tode Chinggis Khans bis zum Zerfall in 
Einzelkhanate," in Die Mongolei. Aspekte ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Graz 2001, 53-60; P. 
lackson, The Mongols and the West 1221-1410. Harlow 2005,58-86. 
5 See U. Schmilewski, Wahlstatt 1241. Beiträge zur Mongolenschlacht bei Liegnitz und zu ih-
ren Nachwirkungen. Würzburg 1991. 
6 According to Rashid ad-Din (Rashid, Successors, 27ff) and Yüan shih (L. Hambis, Le 
chapitre CVII du Yuan Che. Avec des notes supplémentaires par Paul Pelliot. Leiden 1945, 
71ff.), Qadan was the sixth son of Ögödei and a concubine named Erkene. Cf. Göcken-
jan-Sweeney, Der Mongolensturm, 263, n. 14; J. Gießauf, Die Mongolengeschichte des Jo-
hannes von Piano Carpine. Einführung, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar. Graz 1995,169, 
n. 473. 
7 For the "Austrian hospitality", see J. Gießauf, "Herzog Friedrich II. von Österreich und 
die Mongolengefahr 1241/42," in Forschungen zur Geschichte des Alpen-Adria-Raumes. 
Festgabe für em. O. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Othmar Pickl zum 70. Geburtstag, Graz 1997,173-199. 
8 Cf. the report by Juvaini of Chingiz-Khan's order for the pursuit of the Chorezm-Shah: 
"He claimed: It is necessary to make an end of him before men gather around him and 
nobles join him from every side" (luvaini, History, 143). See also Die Mongolengeschichte 
des Johannes von Piano Carpine. Einführimg, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar von J. 
Gießauf. Graz 1995 (henceforth: Carpine, Historia), cap. VI, 16, p. 104: "Et si aliquibus 
aliis parcunt, ut dictum est, nobilibus et honestis hominibus nunquam parcunt ..." and cap. 
VIII, 3, p. 108: "Intendunt etiam delere omnes principes, omnes nobiles, omnes milites et ho-
nestos viros de terra, ut superius dictum est, et hoc faciunt sub dolo et artificióse in subditos 
suos".. Already in 1237-1238 the Hungarian Dominican Friar lulian, following his mis-
sion on behalf of Bela IV to "Greater Hungary", related similar details: "Omnium regno-
rum que obtinent, reges et duces et magnates, de quibus est spes quod aliquando possint facere 
86 
A PROGRAMME OF TERROR AND CRUELTY 
Therefore Bela moved to Trogir (Trau) and then to an adjacent island in the Dal-
matian littoral which the Mongols could not reach for lack of ships. After ravag-
ing Croatia and an unsuccessful attack upon Trogir, Qadan withdrew his troops 
to reunite with the main body of the army because Batu had ordered the sudden 
and unexpected withdrawal of Mongol forces from eastern Central Europe.9 They 
returned east via Zeta, Serbia and Bulgaria, all of which they looted as they 
passed through.10 
Stupefied and shattered, the Europeans could hardly comprehend what had 
happened to them. Reading contemporary chronicles we meet bloody pictures of 
the Mongols and their ruthless atrocity. In western sources the name Tartars was 
applied to the Mongols and their subject peoples. This form, a corruption of the 
tribal name Tatar, apparently derived from Tartarus, the Latin term for the hell of 
classical mythology, was used quite specifically because it carried all the terrible 
connotations of the danger to the west: the Tartars were agents sent from hell, 
breaking forth from the mysterious East, the land of Gog and Magog, to unleash 
their fury upon the Christian world as instruments of divine chastisement.11 The 
trail of death and horror across Eastern Europe was seen in apocalyptic terms. 
Consulting ancient writings - according to Thomas of Spalato especially the say-
ings of the sibyline prophecies of Pseudo Methodius - many thought the Mon-
gols were the people prophesised to precede the coming of Antichrist.12 We are 
confronted with such images for example in the Chronica Maiora of Matthew Par-
is. Despite his geographical distance from the events described, the monk of St 
resistentiam, interficiunt sine mora" (= H. Dörrie, "Drei Texte zur Geschichte der Ungarn 
und Mongolen. Die Missionsreisen des fr. Julian OP. ins Uralgebiet (1234/5) und nach 
Rußland (1237) und der Bericht des Erzbischofs Peter über die Tartaren," Nachrichten 
der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Phil. hist. Kl. 6 (1956), 125-202, cap. 3,5, 
p. 176). 
9 For various theories historians have offered for this withdrawal, see G. S. Rogers, "An 
examination of historians' explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central 
Europe," East European Quarterly 30 (1996), 3-26. 
1 0 See J. V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century 
to the Ottoman Conquest. Ann Arbor 1996,145. 
11 For Latin sources alluding to the assumed provenance of the Mongols from the Tarta-
rus, see C. W. Connell, "Western views of the origin of the 'Tartars': An example of the 
influence of myth in the second half of the thirteenth century," Journal of Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies 3 (1973), 117-119; A. Klopprogge, Ursprung und Ausprägung des abend-
ländischen Mongolenbildes im 13. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden 1993 ,155-159 ; Gießauf, Die 
Mongolengeschichte, 28, n. 104. 
1 2 Thomas Archidiaconus, Historia Salonitana ed. Fr. Raiki, in Monumenta Spectantia Histo-
riam Slavorum Meridionalium XXVI, Scriptores, Vol. 3. Zagreb 1894,171 (henceforth: Tho-
mas, Historia): "Tunc plerique litterati viri veteres scrutantes scripturas, coniiciebant maxime 
ex dictis Methodii martins, has fore illas gentes, que precedere debent antichristi adventum." 
For the interpretation of the Mongols as Gog and Magog, see M. Steinicke, Apokalyp-
tische Heerscharen und Gottesknechte. Wundervölker des Ostens in abendländischer Tradition 
vom Untergang der Antike bis zur Entdeckung Amerikas. Phil. Diss. Berlin 2002, 84-124. 
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Albans is one of the best-known European chroniclers of the Mongol invasion.13 
However, like the majority of chroniclers of these events, he had never seen a Tar-
tar with his own eyes. He shared the dominant view of the Mongols that we can 
find in the majority of European reports of the 1240s: Tartars are the devil's 
horsemen from a mysterious quarter of the Earth, pagans who lack a recognized 
law and indulge in unusual, even bizarre, customs. 
Nevertheless, not everybody accepted such millenarian speculations. We also 
possess first-hand narratives that provide descriptions of Mongol customs and 
practices free of apocalyptic interpretations. However, the number of surviving 
eyewitnesses who had had direct contact with the Mongols was rather small, and 
again only a few of these eyewitnesses and principal reporters were able to look 
beyond the curtain of apparently unfounded and senseless slaughter. 
In the last few decades studies by Bigalli, Connell, Bezzola, Fried, Reichert, 
Klopprogge, Schmieder, Miinkler and Ruotsala have analysed the whole course 
of European-Mongol relations and enlarged our knowledge of the western image 
of the Mongols in the Middle Ages.14 In accordance with their results, the pur-
pose of this paper is to focus on those early narratives that are free of apocalyptic 
speculations, which consider the causes of the success of the Mongol armies. In 
this context I want to take a closer look at first-hand accounts that show percep-
tion of two of the key factors of Mongol strategy, accounts that contain hints of 
the considerable attention the Mongols paid to propaganda and psychological 
warfare by means of cruelty and intimidation.15 
13 Matthew Paris collected news, especially letters, about the Mongols from every part of 
Europe and inserted them into his work. See Matthaeus Parisiensis, Chronica Majora. 
ed. H. R. Luard, Rolls Series. Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores 57, 7 vols. 
London 1872-1883, 3: 488ff, 4: 76-78,109-119, 270-277; 6: 75-84,113-116. For Matthew 
Paris and his Mongol narratives, see J. J. Saunders, "Matthew Paris and the Mongols," 
in Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson, Toronto 1969, 116-132; G. A. 
Bezzola, Die Mongolen in abendländischer Sicht (1220-1270). Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Völ-
kerbegegnungen. Bern 1974, 63. K. Rudolf, "Die Tartaren 1241/42. Nachrichten und Wie-
dergabe: Korrespondenz und Historiographie," Römisch historische Mitteilungen 19 (1977), 
91-99; H. E. Hilpert, Kaiser- und Papstbriefe in den Chronica Majora des Matthaeus Paris. 
Stuttgart 1981, 27-43,153-164. 
14 D. Bigalli, I Tartari e l'Apocalisse. Ricerche sull'eschatologia in Adamo Marsh e Ruggiero Ba-
coné. Florence 1971; Connell, "Western Views," 115-137; Bezzola, Die Mongolen-, J. Fried, 
"Auf der Suche nach der Wirklichkeit. Die Mongolen und die europäische Erfahr-
ungswissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert," Historische Zeitschrift 243 (1986), 287-332; F. E. 
Reichert, Begegnungen mit China. Die Entdeckung Ostasiens im Mittelalter. Sigmaringen 
1992; A. Klopprogge, Ursprung und Ausprägung; F. Schmieder, Europa und die Fremden. 
Die Mongolen im Urteil des Abendlandes vom 13. bis in das 15. Jahrhundert. Sigmaringen 
1994; M. Münkler, Erfahrung des Fremden. Die Beschreibung Ostasiens in den Augenzeu-
genberichten des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts. Berlin 2000; A. Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols 
in the middle of the thirteenth century. Encountering the Other. Helsinki 2001. 
15 More than thirty years ago, Denis Sinor wrote an article on Mongol strategy taking a 
particular interest in the importance of the long-range planning and the rigid timetable 
of Mongol military operations (D. Sinor, "On Mongol Strategy," in Proceedings of the 4th 
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The first reporter to emphasize the important part which terror played in 
Mongol strategy was Roger of Torre Maggiore who writes: 
Soon rumours spread that the Tartars had occupied the German village of 
Thomasbriicke where they slaughtered everyone not fit for slavery. Hearing such 
news my hair stood on end with fright, my whole body started trembling and my 
tongue refused its duty because of the unavoidable and terrible death which 
awaited me. In my mind's eye I saw the slaughterers and the cold sweat of death 
made the blood freeze in my veins. I saw people in fear of death, unable to control 
their hands and weapons, unable to raise their arms or legs only staring into space. 
And what more? I laid my eyes on people half-dead from panic.16 
This vivid description of the dreadful fear of the Mongols is found in Roger's re-
port commonly known as the Carmen Miserabile. A canon of the Hungarian city of 
Várad (now Oradea in Romania), Roger had been taken prisoner by the invaders 
in 1241 and had lived several months under their dominion before he could es-
cape. His account, probably written immediately after the unexpected withdraw-
al of the Mongols in 1242, represents one of the major western narratives of the 
Mongol invasion of Europe and there is nothing to discredit the details of which 
he was an eyewitness.17 Analogous to Persian, Chinese or Russian sources, Roger 
East Asian Altaistic Conference. Taiwan 1975, 238-245). However, the role of cruelty and 
intimidation in Mongol warfare was not part of his considerations. The same applies to 
his article on Inner Asian warriors (D. Sinor, "The Inner Asian Warriors," Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 101 (1981), 133-144). lean Richard in his paper about causes of 
the Mongol victories at least deals with the employment of captives as arrow-fodder 
0. Richard, "Les causes des victoires Mongoles d'après les historiens occidentaux du 
XIIIe siècle," Central Asiatic Journal 22 (1979), 112.). The best outline of this topic so far is 
that by Hansgerd Göckenjan, who took a particular interest in spies and reconnoitres 
(H. Göckenjan, "Kundschafter und Späher. Ein Beitrag zur Strategie und Taktik reiter-
nomadischer Kriegsführung," Acta Orientalia Accademiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 53 (2000), 
187-202). Cf. also the analysis of the role of massacres and cruelty in Mongol warfare 
by C. Commeaux, La vie quotidienne chez les Mongols de la conquètte. Paris 1972,141-147. 
16 Epistola magistri Rogerii in Miserabile Carmen super destructione regni Hungarie per Tartaros 
facta ed. L. luhâsz, in Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum tempore ducum regumque stirpis Ar-
padianae gestarum, Vol. 2. Budapest 1938, cap. 34, 579 (henceforth: Rogerius, Carmen): 
"Post hec statim invaluere rumores, quod dictum Pontem Thome Theutonicorum villam in au-
rora Tartari occupaverunt et, quos tenere noluerant, horrenda crudelitas acerbitatis gladio dire 
iugulavit. Quo audito incorruerunt pili carnis mee, cepit corpus tremere ac pavere, lingua mise-
rabiliter balbutire perspiciens, quod dire mortis articulus, qui iam vitari non poterat, immine-
bat. Trucidatores cordis oculis intuebar, caro sudore mortis frigidissimum emittebat. Videbam 
et mortales mortem expectantes assidue non posse manus et arma extendere, engere brachia, 
pedes ad deffensionis loca movere, oculis terram prospicere. Et quod plura? Homines conspicie-
bam ex timore nimio semivivos." 
17 For his life and work, see F. Babinger, "Maestro Ruggiero delle Puglie, relatore prepo-
liano su i Tartari," in Nel VII. centenario della nascita di Marco Polo. Venice 1955, 51-62; 
Bezzola, Die Mongolen, 86-89; Göckenjan-Sweeney, Der Mongolensturm, 129-138. For 
some considerations about the transmission of the text, see T. Alrnasi, "The Carmen Mi-
serabile: Some issues concerning the transmission of the text," Chronica 3 (2003), 84-93. 
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relates the unheard-of Mongol severity in punishing the citizens of towns which 
had tried to resist the Mongol assaults. The Mongols used to call a town showing 
no intention of surrendering to the besiegers mo balyq, which means 'bad city7. All 
the citizens of so-called bad cities were driven together outside the city7s walls 
and slain.18 These proceedings were intended to be a warning of terrible retalia-
tion for other cities and were aimed at intimidation. The message of the Mongols 
was clear: a peaceful surrender or an anticipatory declaration of allegiance could 
enable a ruler to keep his throne and a population to escape a massacre, but resis-
tance almost invariably meant decimation or extermination.19 
Very similar information about the Mongol tactic of demoralizing the foe by 
means of cruelty can be obtained from the Mongol chapters in the Historia Pontifi-
cum Salonitanorum atque Spalatensium of Thomas of Spalato, which is among the 
most outstanding sources of the 1240s about the Mongols.20 Thomas pursued a 
career as canon of the cathedral chapter of Spalato (Split) and in 1230 he was 
elected archdeacon, a post he held until his death in 1268. It is likely that he be-
gan to write his Historia between 1245 and 1251. Thomas's Mongol narrative 
comprises four chapters of the Historia which treat the sequence of events in 
Hungary and Dalmatia from the first rumours of the approach of the Mongols 
late in the decade of the 1230s to their departure in the spring of 1242.21 The 
flamboyant manner in which he describes the Tartars shows that to him they are a 
plague, people lacking compassion and humanity. Although Thomas condemns 
them with the severest criticism he is curious about their origins and customs and 
includes such information in his Historia. Despite his conception of the Tartars as 
a "pestilential nation,"22 his Mongol chapters exhibit a high degree of factual ac-
curacy. Apart from his own observation, Thomas's sources must have been refu-
gees who streamed into Split in 1242, fleeing in terror from the troops of the 
Mongol prince Qadan. He says that his description of the Mongols is related "ac-
cording to what I have been able to hear from more inquiring persons who have 
looked into the matter."23 
Thomas writes: 
At this time this monstrous slaughterer [=Qadan] ordered his men to drive all 
the captives [...] together on a plain - men and women as well as boys and girls. 
Gathering them together like a flock of sheep he made his executioners behead 
18 For such massacres in the realm of the Chorezm-Shah, see Juvaini, History, 121, 131, 
145. Cf. Gockenjan-Sweeney, Der Mongolensturm, 52. 
19 For possible demographic considerations behind these massacres, see J. Masson Smith, 
"Demographic considerations in Mongol siege warfare," Archivum Ottomanicum 13 
(1993/94), 329-334. 
20 For his life and work, see I. R. Sweeney, "Thomas of Spalato and the Mongols: A thir-
teenth-century Dalmatian view of Mongol customs," Florilegium 4 (1982), 156-183; 
Gockenjan-Sweeney, Der Mongolensturm, 227-235. 
21 Thomas, Historia, cap. XXXVI-XXXIX, 132-178. 
22 Thomas, Historia, cap. XXXVI, 132: "gens pestifera Tartarorum". 
23 Thomas, Historia, cap. XXXVII, 168: "Nunc vero de natura et habitu gentis illius [= Tartaro-
rum], prout ab his audire potui, qui rem curiosius indagarunt, pauca narrabo". 
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them all. Everyone broke into loud lamentations and at the wail of people being 
slain the whole world seemed to quake. All captives were cut down and like 
sheaves in a cornfield, their corpses were strewn on the plain. But the Tartars did 
not plunder the dead, to make clear that they had not slaughtered them because of 
lust for booty. The whole host of murderous people, taking their ease in camp ca-
maraderie in the midst of those dead, began to dance and feast with great delight, 
and to shake with great mocking laughter, as though these fine men had performed 
some great deed.24 
According to Thomas, after the battle of Mohi the Mongols did not show any in-
terest in booty. They concentrated their efforts on pursuing and killing their ex-
hausted and terrified enemies because this was the best way to avoid further 
Hungarian resistance.25 Very similar observations were made by Roger of Torre 
Maggiore who writes about Mongolian slaughterers who were not interested in 
loot.26 On another occasion, Thomas of Spalato reports that during the winter of 
1241/42, to instill fear into the Hungarians, the Mongols rode up and down the 
left bank of the Danube - where they had piled their slain enemies - with the 
corpses of children impaled on lances, in Thomas's words, "like fish on a spear".27 
John of Piano Carpine gives a matter of fact description of Mongol tactics de-
void of such dramatic sketches. He simply states: 
When the Tartars are going to make war, they send ahead an advance guard 
and these carry nothing with them but their tents, horses and arms. They seize no 
plunder, burn no houses and slaughter no animals; they only wound and kill men 
2 4 Thomas, Historia cap. XXXIX, 174: "Tune truculentus camifex iussit omnem captivitatem, 
quam ex Hungaria duxerat, congregan in unum, multitudinem magnam virorum et mulierum, 
puerorum et puellarum, fecitque omnes in quandam planiciem duci. Et cum omnes quasi quí-
dam grex ouium coadunati faissent, missis spiculatoribus, omniumfecit capita amputan. Tum 
ingens audiebatur ululatus et planctus, totaque térra moveri a voce pereuncium videbatur. Ia-
cuerunt autem omnes in illa prostrati planicie, quemadmodum spicarum manipuli sparsim so-
lent in agro iacere. Et ne cui videretur, quod cedis huius immanitas spoliorum sit avidatate pa-
trata, nullas ab eis vestes detrahere voluerunt; sed tota multitudo funeste gentis in circuitu oc-
cisorum illorum per contubernia discumbentes, ceperunt in magna leticia comedere, choreas du-
cere magnosque cachinnos ludendo movere, quasi multum aliquid perpetrassent boni." 
25 Thomas, Historia cap. XXXVI: 163: "Iacebant autem per vias infelicium opes, vasa aurea et 
argentea, purpurea indumenta, et arma copiosa. Sed Tartarorum inaudita crudelitas nil curans 
de spoliis, omnem pretiosarum rerum parvi pendens predam, in sola hominum cede crassarunt. 
Cum enim viderent iam itineris labore defessos, nec posse ad arma manus estendere, nec pedes 
ulterius ad fugam laxare, tune ceperunt hinc et inde iaculis infringere, gladiis obtruncare, nuli 
parcere, sed omnes feraliter trucidare." 
2 6 Rogerius, Carmen, cap. 30: 573: "Argentea quoque vasa et aurea, serice vestes et alia homini-
bus oportuna per campos et silvas a fugientibus proiecta, ut ipsi velociori cursu manus inse-
quentium evaderent, non habebant aliquos collectores. Tartaris tantum interfectionibus homi-
num insistentibus de spoliis minime curare videbantur." Cf. Gockenjan-Sweeney, Der Mon-
golensturm, 213, n. 163. 
27 Thomas, Historia cap. XXXVI: 167s. "Et ut metum incuterent his, qui erant ex altera parte 
Danubii, collectam multitudinem occisorum in acervos plurimos super ripam fluminis locave-
runt. Alii vero puerulos lancéis afñgentes, quasi pisces in veru, per horas alvei baiulabant." 
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or, if they can do nothing else, put them to flight. They much prefer, however, to 
kill than to put to flight. 28 
John of Piano Carpine, a Franciscan friar who had taken a leading part in the es-
tablishment of the Franciscan Order in Europe, had been dispatched in 1245 by 
Innocent IV as papal envoy to the Mongol court. He and his Polish companion, 
Brother Benedict, were the first European travellers of the thirteenth century who 
penetrated to the core of the Mongol Empire. John, however, was not only 
charged with the delivery of two papal bulls addressed to the "King of the Tar-
tars"29; he also had the task of furnishing the pope with first-hand intelligence 
about the "devil's envoys and servants of hell".30 As a result of his two-year mis-
sion to Central Asia he compiled, in two redactions, a detailed dossier on the hi-
therto relatively unknown enemy. His Historia Mongalorum, which was by far the 
most widely known of all the early accounts of Mongols, provides information 
that can be shown to be largely trustworthy.31 He was the first European who 
properly understood the significance of the Mongol army establishment and pre-
sented an outline of it. Two chapters of his book are dedicated to Mongol warfare 
2 8 Carpine, Historia, cap. VI, 11: 103; English translation: The Mongol Mission. Narratives 
and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. Translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey, ed. C. Dawson, London and 
New York 1955, 35. For the advance guard (precursores), see G. Dörfer, Türkische und 
mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen, Vol. 4, Wiesbaden 1975, 148; Göckenjan, Kund-
schafter und Späher, 194. In similar words the Franciscan friar C. de Bridia gives an out-
line of the duties of the Mongol advance guards: "Cumque Tartari propinquare ceperint, 
premittunt uelocissimos cursors, qui terreant ex inspirato homines et Occident, ne possit contra 
eos exercitus subito congregari" (Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia Monachi. A. Önnerfors, 
ed., Berlin 1967, cap. 56: 34). C. de Bridia, however, cannot be regarded as an authentic 
and independent source because his Hystoria Tartarorum is only a summary of the re-
ports of Carpine and his companion Benedict the Pole. For his work, see Gießauf, Die 
Mongolengeschichte, 55. 
2 9 The two letters of Pope Innocent IV (5 March 1245, Dei patris immensa, and 13 March 
1245, Cum non solum) are addressed "... regi et populo Tartarorum". See MGH Epistulae 
saeculi XIII selectae: II, 72, n. 102, and 74, n. 105; K.-E. Lupprian, Die Beziehungen der 
Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Brief-
wechsels. Vatican City 1981, 141-145, n. 20 and 146-149, n. 21. For further details see 
Gießauf, Die Mongolengeschichte, 35, 77. 
30 "... Sathane nuntios tartarique ministros", as Innocent IV called them in a letter of 21 July 
1243 (MGH Epistulae saeculi XIII selectae: II, 3s., n. 2). 
31 For his life, his mission and his work, see Giovanni di Pian di Carpine, Storia dei Mon-
goli, P. Daffina, C. Leonardi, M. C. Lungarotti, E. Menestö, and L. Petech, eds, Spoleto 
1989, 49-92; Gießauf, Die Mongolengeschichte, 73-84; F. Schmieder, Johannes von Piano 
Carpini. Kunde von den Mongolen 1245-1247, Sigmaringen 1997, 14-31; J. Gießauf, "Jo-
hannes von Piano del Carpine. Provinzialminister 1232-1239," in Management und Mi-
noritas. Lebensbilder Sächsischer Franziskanerprovinziale vom 13. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, Ke-
velaer 2003, 2-18. 
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and to suggestions for practicable European counter-measures.32 Alongside strat-
egy his interest is focused on other military questions like discipline, horseman-
ship, the equipment of the warrior's mount and his personal weapons. 
The common denominator of the quoted sources is their realization that one 
important factor of Mongol success was the weakening and demoralization of the 
foe by means of cruelty. Beyond that we see from these quotations that some 
western reporters were able to comprehend that the Christian world was not con-
fronted with the crude blood-thirst of barbarians but with a complex plan of total 
warfare and deliberate terror.33 
A second significant aspect of Mongol strategy combined this program of psy-
chological warfare with the practical advantage of providing a buffer in the initial 
stages of an attack: the ruthless employment of captives as arrow-fodder. 
We find very detailed descriptions of this tactical device in Mongol tradition, 
such as the Secret History of the Mongols of the thirteenth century34, in the reports 
of Persian historians like Juvairii35 and in contemporary Chinese sources like 
Meng-Ta pei-lu, which offers the most precise outline36: The Mongols began with 
32 Carpine, Historia, cap. VI (101-104) and VIII (107-111): "De hello, et ordinatione acierum, 
et armis, et astutiis in congressione, et crudelitate captivorum, et oppugnatione munitionum, et 
perfidia eorum in iis qui se reddunt eisdem"; and: "Quomodo bello Tartaris occuratur, et quid 
attendunt, et de armis et ordinatione acierum, et quomodo occuratur eorum astutiis in pugna, 
et munitione castrorum et civitatum, et quid faciendum est de captivis"). 
33 Similar conclusions were drawn by Vernadsky-Karpovich, The Mongols, 116; Bezzola, 
Die Mongolen, 88; Göckenjan-Sweeney, Der Mongolensturm, 52-54; and D. O. Morgan, 
The Mongols. Oxford 1987, 92, who states: "Chingiz's principle seems to have been 
much the same as President Truman's over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The apparent ra-
tionale was that if the population of one city was subjected to a frightful massacre, the 
next city would be more likely to surrender without resistance, thus avoiding unneces-
sary Mongol casualties. The morality of this approach to warfare is no doubt open to 
discussion, but there can be no disputing that it worked." For the topos of the wild and 
animal-like barbarian, see K. Lechner, Hellenen und Barbaren im Weltbild der Byzantiner. 
Die alten Bezeichnungen als Ausdruck eines neuen Kulturbewusstseins, Phil. Diss. Munich 
1954, especially 107-114; B. D. Shaw, "Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk: The Ancient 
Mediterranean ideology of the pastoral nomad," Ancient Society 13 /14 (1982/83), 5-31; 
J. Gießauf, Barbaren - Monster - Gottesgeißeln. Steppennomaden im europäischen Spiegel der 
Spätantike und des Mittelalters. Graz 2006. 
34 Geheime Geschichte der Mongolen § 265:198. 
3 5 Cf. luvaini, History, 107: "When the town [= Buchara] and citadel had been purged of 
rebels and the walls and outworks levelled with the dust, all the inhabitants of the 
town, men and women, ugly and beautiful, were driven out on the field of the musalla. 
Chingiz-Khan spared their lives; but the youths and full-grown men that were fit for 
such service were pressed into a levy for the attack on Sarmaqand and Dabusiya." For 
very similar accounts, see ibid. 53, 92 and 100. 
3 6 The following passage summarizes the German translations of the Meng-ta pei-lu and 
the Hei-Ta shih-lüeh. See Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh. Chinesische Gesandtenbe-
richte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237. Nach Vorarbeiten von Erich Haenisch 
und Yao Ts'ung-wu übersetzt und kommentiert von P. Olbricht und E. Pinks, Wiesba-
den 1980, 53 and 191. 
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the capture of the small settlements in a region in order to provide themselves 
with sufficient manpower to help in the capture of larger towns and cities nearby. 
In heavy assaults captives were given the task of advancing ahead of the Mongol 
army to weaken the enemy whose exhausted troops were finally overrun by the 
Mongols. 
Several other eastern sources confirm this account37 and similar information 
can be found in nearly all the major trustworthy western reports in which we 
hear about the custom of driving prisoners in front of the main army as arrow-
fodder.38 They had to fill up the moats of besieged towns, to erect siege engines 
under fire from the defenders and finally to head the storming parties. Only a 
few supervising Mongols took part in these suicide missions to prevent the cap-
tives from fleeing.39 However, these captives did not only serve as human targets 
to minimize casualties among the Mongols; they also fulfilled a psychological 
role. The justified Mongol expectation was that the defenders under siege would 
be reluctant to kill their own relatives and compatriots as they were driven for-
ward in front of the attackers. The intention behind these atrocities - to strike ter-
ror into the hearts of opponents - was indeed successful, as is shown by the evi-
dence of several cities that surrendered promptly to the Mongols.40 
Concerning the treatment of captives and subdued peoples we owe the best 
Latin summary report to John of Piano Carpine who writes: 
They send a detachment of captives and men of other nationalities who are 
fighting with them to meet the enemy head-on, and some Tartars may perhaps ac-
company them [...] Moreover, when it pleases the masters they take all the young 
men with their wives and children and compel them to follow them with all their 
household; from henceforth they are counted as Tartars, or rather as captives, for 
although they are numbered among the Tartars, they are never shown the respect 
37 Cf. B. Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran. Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220-
1350. Leipzig 1939, 415, 418; D. H. Martin, "The Mongol Army," Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society (1943), 67. Liu K'i, "Aufzeichnungen von den Vorgängen in Ta-Liang," 
in Zum Untergang zweier Reiche. Berichte von Augenzeugen aus den Jahren 1232-33 und 
1368-70. Wiesbaden 1969,14. 
38 Cf. the Hungarian Dominican friar Julian cap. 3 , 6 - 1 0 (= Dörrie, Drei Texte, 176s.); Mat-
thaeus Parisiensis, Chronica Majora IV, 76; Rogerius, Carmen, cap. 37, 582; Thomas, His-
toric cap. XXXVII: 170; Carpine, Historia, cap. VIII, 6:108s. 
39 From Juvaini, History, 53, we learn that some of these Mongols were criminals sen-
tenced to death whose lives had been spared on condition that they took part in such 
dangerous operations. Cf. also Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh, 163, n. 7; Göckenjan, 
Kundschafter und Späher, 194. 
4 0 In my opinion, Stephen Turnbull's conclusion about the efficiency of Mongol terror in 
the Middle East is probably accurate: " . . . it is interesting to note the ease with which 
Genghis Khan captured cities in the central Asian Muslim world compared to similar 
operations in China. The Chinese had learned to live with nomad hordes over the cen-
turies and were used to their ways, but to the subjects of the Khwarazm Shah the 
Mongols were strange, alien savages, and it was this barbarian factor that Genghis 
Khan exploited so well" (S. Turnbull, "Man or Monster? The Real Genghis Khan," Mili-
tary Illustrated 184 (2003), 31). 
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that these enjoy but are treated as slaves and are sent into every kind of danger like 
other prisoners; they are first in battle and if a swamp or a dangerous river has to 
be crossed, they have to try the passage first.41 
The Franciscan writes elsewhere that the Mongolian captains of a hundred divide 
those captives who are to be killed among other captives whom they want to 
keep as slaves and they force the latter to kill ten or more of their compatriots.42 
The facts of Mongol cruelty and massacres speak for themselves. They could 
produce a terror so stupefying that, as Ibn al-Atir records, a single Mongol 
horseman could enter a Persian village and begin killing people while no one 
dared to raise a hand to stop him. Furthermore the chronicler had heard that one 
Mongol took a man captive, but had no weapon with which to kill him. He told 
his prisoner to lie with his head on the ground without moving. The terror-
stricken man did so, and remained there until the Mongol returned from fetching 
his sword and cut his head off.43 It is quite obvious that Ibn al-Atir exaggerated 
the details. Important, however, seems to me the clearly visible effect of Mongol 
strategy behind this story. Because of the brutal success of the Mongols, their 
enemies were often in a state of terror and, in effect, were already defeated psy-
chologically before they were even engaged in battle. Therefore the Mongols fos-
tered their terrible image to fool their victims into thinking that they were super-
human, mounted demons appearing out of nowhere to destroy utterly the known 
world.44 One can find confirmation for this psychological advantage of the Tartars 
in the simple statement of the Franciscan Friar Jordan of Giano in his letter to 
Duke Henry of Brabant: "... sola nominis sui [= Tartari] formidine multos in fugam 
convertunt" ,45 At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Byzantine historian 
Georgios Pachymeres confirms in similar words that the Mongols used their hor-
« Carpine, Historia, cap. VI, 14:103s. and cap. VII, 11:107. 
4 2 Carpine, Historia, cap. VI, 17: 104: "In bellis autem quoscumque capiunt occident, nisi 
forte velint aliquos reservare, ut habeant eos pro servis. Occidendos autem dividunt 
per centenarios, ut cum bipenni interfeciantur ab eis; ipsi vero post hec dividunt per 
captivos, et unicuique servo ad interficiendum dant decern aut plures aut pauciores se-
cundum quod maioribus placet". For the correct interpretation of this text, see 
Schmieder, Johannes von Piano Carpini, 144s., n. 143. 
4 3 I follow the French translation of the Persian text from M. C. d' Ohsson, Histoire des 
Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan, Vol. 3, The Hague and 
Amsterdam 1834-1835, 69s. 
4 4 Cf. the thoughts of the Arabian doctor Ibn al-Labbad: "Sie [= Tartaren] töten aus-
nahmslos und unbarmherzig. Es ist, als ob ihr Zweck die Austilgung der Menschengat-
tung wäre ... Es erhellt hieraus, dass sie nicht so sehr nach Besitz und Vermögen stre-
ben, sondern nach Zerstörung der Welt, damit sie zur Wüste werde", quoted in J. v. 
Somogyi, "Ein arabischer Bericht über die Tataren im 'Ta'rih al-Isläm" von ad-Dahabf 
von ad-Dahabi," Der Islam 24 (1937), 115. 
4 5 Jordan's letter of May 1241 in Matthaeus Parisiensis, Chronica Majora VI: 84. 
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rible reputation as a psychological weapon that made the emperor shiver with 
dreadful fear.46 
To summarize this examination of the western sources of the 1240s, with addi-
tional reference to the eastern chronicles of the thirteenth century, it may be con-
cluded that some of the early writers left the beaten tracks of interpretation to a 
remarkable extent. Reporters like Roger of Torre Maggiore, Thomas of Spalato 
and particularly John of Piano Carpine did not use the standard apocalyptic or 
barbarian models to explain Mongol atrocities but were able to recognize the con-
cept of violence and fear as an intrinsic part of Mongol strategy. In this way they 
were undoubtedly pioneers in transforming the Tartars into human beings (cruel, 
greedy and irritating, of course, but still human beings) and cutting them down 
to size. In their reports dealing with the crushing defeats by the hitherto un-
known enemies the authority of topos was undermined by the power of individ-
ual experience. As a result, several years later, the anonymous author of the an-
nals of the cathedral chapter of Krakow had no problems in revealing the secrets 
of success of this strange people: neither outstanding strength nor courage but 
the deliberate employment of immeasurable atrocity and cunningness.47 The Eu-
ropeans had become acquainted with Mongol strategy. This did not help much in 
battle against the well trained steppe nomads, but the knowledge, and conse-
quent démystification of the enemy, increased the potential for seeking counter-
measures in place of the preoccupation with lamentations about the scourge 
of God. 
46 G. Pachymérès, Relations historiques. A. Failler, e<±, French trans. V. Laurent. Paris 1984, 
II : 24 : 187: εννοειν ώστε και έως εκείνου και τοονομα μόνον εισ φόβον ηγεισθαι και 
δεδιέκαι. 
47 Annales Capituli Cracoviensis in MGH SS XIX, 598, ad annum 1241: "[Thartari]... illesi ad 
propria per Hungariam, totum mundum ex sua crudelitate gravi horroris percellentes formi-
dine, redierunt. Quos tamen non robur virium efficit formidandos, nec robusti brachii fortitudo, 
verum sola cruenta crudelitas ac infidelitas versucia fraudulenta." 
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